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Introduction 
 
The debate over network neutrality has become a huge debate in Internet policy both in 
US and European Union. The question is whether the traffic management practices of 
network providers should be control by regulators and how should be defined rules 
allowing a better economic efficiency. In practice, network neutrality has been often 
interpreted as a set of rules allowing non-discrimination both between contents providers 
and end-users. For a long time and until networks could handle the traffic generated by 
uses, network neutrality has resulted in a free and open access to network for content 
providers. The main idea was that externalities from diversity of available contents to 
end-users on platforms justified an indirect mechanism of cross-subsidy through users' 
payments to access providers. Today the situation is different since traffics had sharply 
rose because of the increasing development of contents and thus, network investments 
by operators are became a necessity to support traffics. The question that arises directly 
from such an observation is twofold: How to give incentives to invest? How allocate 
investments financing between stakeholders? Beyond these questions analyzing the 
benefits and pitfalls of non-discrimination/discrimination rules for network access is a key 
component to evaluate the Internet policy. 
Because of the diversity of practices and the complexity in the economic relations 
between network providers, content providers and Internet intermediaries, it is not easy 
to define what is exactly non-discrimination rules. However, one can consider that non-
discrimination occurs whenever a network provider gives a same access to network 
traffics of the same characteristics. This does not imply that the network provider must 
treat different networks traffics from different contents providers in the same manner 
(same tariffs, same QoS...). So, the economic literature indicates that discrimination may 
improve economic efficiency whenever it does not lead to anti-competitive practices. The 
main goal of our paper is to show how different pricing schemes affect investment 
incentives of network providers, social welfare and its distribution between the 
stakeholders (network providers, contents providers and end-users). In particular, we 
focus in the following on the relevant impacts of termination fees. 
A large strand of literature has recently developed on network neutrality. Most of papers 
were discussing legal issues of network neutrality and the expected consequences of its 
abolition. Economic analysis in this field is less developed although some recent 
theoretical research has been made in the field of two-sided market models. However, 
the analysis is not usually straightforward as network neutrality can be defined in several 
ways. 
Economides and Tag (2007) model the Internet Broadband market as a two-sided 
platform in which broadband consumers stand on one side and content providers on the 
other side. Their results show that network neutrality regulation (that imposes zero fees 
on the opposite side of the market) generally increases industry surplus compared to the 
fully private optimum
1 at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content 
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These authors define the fully private optimum as the overall profit maximizing scheme for the monopolistic platform. 
 and applications providers. As platforms have incentives to attract more consumers to 
generate revenue from charging content provider, without network neutrality regulation 
they set a lower subscription fee, hence consumers' surplus increases. This positive 
impact is offset by the negative effect on content provision and finally, the welfare 
increases with network neutrality. In contrast, Hermalin and Katz (2007) consider 
network neutrality as a situation in which the broadband platform produces a single 
access quality (non discriminatory access quality). They assume both traditional markets 
and two-sided markets where platform providers offer services making a connection 
between consumers and Internet applicant providers. Network neutrality plays as a 
product-line restriction and as a direct effect low valuation applicant providers get ruled 
out of the market. Their results show that network neutrality regulation by product 
restriction may hinder both consumers' surplus and social welfare. 
The effect of network neutrality regulation on investments incentives for network 
providers is analyzed by Choi and Kim (2008). They define network neutrality as non-
discriminatory in the delivery of content through networks. The model developed is 
based on the queuing theory developed in operational research to take clearly account 
of bandwidth scarcity and the need for rationing as the main causes of the network 
neutrality regulation debate. In this setting, they show that the network providers' 
decision on the discrimination across content depends on a potential trade-off between 
access fee and the revenue from the trade of the first priority. Concerning the network 
providers' investment incentives, their results show that the growth in capacity affects 
the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. They conclude that as 
the relative merit of the first priority becomes relatively small for higher level capacity, 
under discrimination the network's incentives to invest may be smaller than that under 
network neutrality regulation where such rent extraction effects does not exist. Finally, 
the welfare effects of network neutrality regulation is ambiguous and depends largely on 
how capacity expansion affects the need to acquire the priority right and thus the ability 
to extract rent from content providers. Close to Choi and Kim (2008), Cheng et al. (2009) 
develop a game theoretic model to highlight gainers and losers of abolishing network 
neutrality and to analyze the broadband providers' incentives to expand capacity. They 
find that content providers are left worse off when network neutrality is abolished and 
consumer surplus either does not change or is higher in the short run. In the short run, 
social welfare increases whether one content provider pays for preferential treatment but 
remains unchanged whether both contents providers pay. Finally, they find that incentive 
to invest in capacity for broadband provider is generally higher under the neutrality 
regulation because the network owner incurs a lost from the content provider's side 
without net neutrality. 
In this paper, we explicitly model the Internet broadband market as a platform consisting 
of end-users on one side and contents providers on the other side. We do not aim here 
to show how crossed externalities between both sides of the platform affects prices and 
social welfare. This question has been developed by a large literature. Our goal is to 
show how, in a simple model, different pricing schemes from the so-called "net neutrality 
" may increased economic efficiency by allowing more investment of access providers 
and enhancing consumers surplus and social welfare. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section sets up the model of network 
markets. Section 3 analyses the effects of network neutrality regulation on competition 
and social welfare and studies the impacts of introducing termination fees to reach end-
users for content providers. Section 4 provides a complete analysis of the impacts of 
termination fees discrimination on investment incentives of network provider and 
stakeholders surplus. Section 5 offers extensions around the basis model examining the 
impact of termination fee discrimination on incentives to invest of the broadband 
provider, and how termination fee may induce more traffic management from content 
providers. Section 6 closes these analyses with concluding remarks. Most of the proofs 
for lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix. 
 
1. The model 
 
We consider a model in which a monopolistic Internet service provider (ISP) sells 
broadband Internet access to consumers. Consumers can freely obtain the contents of 
two Content providers (CPs) from broadband Internet access. In that setting, we study 
how different pricing schemes may impact consumers surplus, firms' profits (ISP and 
CPs) and social welfare. This especially allows to analyze the ISP's incentives to invest 
to upgrade its network quality according to net neutrality is applied or not and how 
regulation may be relaxed. For the sake of analysis, we will define in the following net 
neutrality as non-discrimination in the delivery of contents. That is, the ISP provides 
access to content providers at a unique fixed fee, in order to make their content 
available across the Internet, and offers access network to consumers at a non 
discriminatory flat rate. 
 
Content providers 
We consider competition between two content providers differentiated à la Hotelling. 
Both content provider use the same technology and we normalize the marginal cost to 0. 
For connecting to the ISP, the content provider  i  bears the fixed fee   i f   and pays a 
unit price     for each users. We suppose that content provider     can exert an effort 
denoted  
i s i
i   in order to attract users towards their own content, where   0   i  . Such 
effort  i   can represent the quality of content that CP ioffers to end-users. This quality 
represents a quality index that encompasses editorial design, web design and so on. In 
the following, we consider that the cost function is quadratic,  
2
2
 ()  i 
i
ii C . Without loss 
of generality, we will assume that   1 1     and   2 1      . That is, the CP2 is assumed 
to be less efficient than CP1. Furthermore, a content provider gets revenues from 




Internet service provider 
The monopolistic ISP,  I , sells a network access to end-users and provides access to 
content providers. The ISP can invest  i  to increase the quality of network access for 
content    . This assumption take into account situations where the ISP can discriminate  ibetween both content providers using the quality of access (i.e. access prioritization). An 
example of this kind of investment is an upgrade in network access with fibre optic 
cables to increase the capacity to deliver voice and data traffic. This in turn increases 
the end-users' utility when they get content from content providers and hence increases 
their willingness to pay for contents. We assume that the quality of network access 
affects the quality of content in a multiplicative form. In particular, we consider that when 
the ISP invests  i , the gross utility for an end-user consuming the content of quality  i   
is   (1 )    ii  . Focusing on incentives to invest only, we normalize the cost of this 
investment to zero, without loss of generality. We assume that the ISP charges an 
access fee   i p   from connected end-users for content  i . On the other side of the 
market, the ISP collects a fixed fee   i f   for content provider  i  to allow access to its 
network and a unit price   i s   for each user connected who consumes content  i . This 
unit price corresponds here to a termination fees charged to content provider  i  to 
reach end-users. The ISP bears a fixed cost normalized to  0   to connect the two sides 
of the market, and a same marginal cost  c  for each unit of traffic coming from users 
and content providers. Under a networ  neutral regime, the ISP cannot price 
discriminate users, hence the access fee does not depends on which content is 
consumed,   12 
k
p pp . The same applies for content providers and we assume that 
they can get access to the network at a non discriminatory fixed fee,   12  f ff , without 
paying a termination fee for each consumer connected,   0  i s . 
 
Co
y  ated on  se ent 
nsumers 
ni  [0, 1] . The two content providers are  Consumers are u forml loc the  gm
located at the two extremities of the segment, namely at   1 0  x   and   2 1  x   
(respectively for CP 1  and CP 2 ). We assume that consumers single-home, th  
each consumer buys Internet access from the ISP and consume one content only. Given 
the transportation unit cost  t  and the quality of network access   0
at is
  i  , the utility for a 
consumer located at   [0, 1]  x   subscribing to the ISP is   11 1 (1 )     p  tx  if he gets 
content from CP 1 , a 2 2 ) (1 ) nd 2 (1        p tx   if he gets contents from CP 2 . We 
consider here that the qua ss affects positively end-user's utility 
whether he gets contents from CP 1  o r  C P  2 . That is, there may be asymmetry 
between content providers based on network's quality. 
Let  
lity of n or cce etw k a
   denote the difference in the quality of network access for content providers, that 
is,   12   . 
We  re

can interp t ,     as the degree of non price discrimination between both content 
providers. There is no discrimination in access quality between content providers when  
0    , that is   12     . This is because when the ISP does not discriminate content 
ers using t lity of network access (as management traffic), the two CPs are 
perceived as completely identical from the end-users point of view if the quality of 
contents are the same,   12
provid he qua









t  . This assumption limits the asymmetry in non price 
discrimination, and assumes away market cornering
2. When the ISP does not 
discriminate CPs using access quality ( 12     ), this assumption becomes  
12     
t  , 
and it implies   12     . 
 
Surplus and welfare 
We only consider full market coverage and we denote by   1    and   2 (1 ) 1     market 
shares for both content providers. Explicitly, the marginal consumer's is defined by: 
11 1 222 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )        p tx p t x  
Market shares are determined as follows:  
 21 12 1 12 2
1 2
() 1
 and  1
22
   
1  






  (1.1) 
 
Under a discriminatory network regime, the profit for the ISP is: 
11 1 22 2 1 (2 ) ( 2 )           I p sc p sc f f   (1.2) 
 
and the profit for CP    is given by:  i
(1.1)
2 ( , ) ( )           for  , 1, 2 and 
2

       
i
ii j i i i i as f ij i j   (1.3) 
The impact of different pricing schemes can be evaluated by assessing consumer’s 
surplus, profits of CPs and ISP, and social surplus. For regulatory purpose, it is possibly 
important to consider not only social surplus as a welfare measure but also consumer’s 
surplus. Moreover, a regulator with the objective to encourage a broad diffusion of 
contents should take care of the benefit for ISP from different pricing schemes and 
especially from network neutrality. 
Industry profit  IP
2
  is equal to the sum of profits both for ISP and CPs, i.e.   
. Consumers' surplus, defined as the consumers ' aggregate net utility, 
is given by: 









11 1 222 0
22
11 1 1 22 2 2 1 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )




     
      
     
 CS p tx dx p t x dx
t
pp
  (1.4) 
 
Remark that the last term in (1.4) assesses the effect produced by the ISP's investment 
in access quality into the disutility that consumers incur getting content from a content 
providers. The total surplus is     TS IP CS  . 
As mentioned above, we consider that under network neutrality, the access provider 
                                                 
12 
2
Market cornering happens, for example, when end-users can get access with a same price   p pp  , and all 
end-users consume only from the content provider with the high quality. 
 
 cannot price discriminate neither end-users nor content providers. The following analysis 
considers two cases according to the ISP can offer content providers a pricing scheme 
including a termination fee or not. We first consider that content providers pay a non 
discriminatory flat rate to get access from the ISP and secondly that content providers 
pay a unit price for each consumer they attract with their contents. We also assume that 
ISP does not discriminate CP's using its investment for access quality i.e.   12    . 
For each case, we analyze a sequential game where in the first stage  ets the ISP s  
access prices for both side of the market (i.e.   ,, iii p sf ) and, in the second stage 
content providers choose their quality of contents (i.e.  i ). We solve this game by 
backward induction. 
 
2. The benchmark analysis: flat rates 
e consider first the network neutrality case. In this situation, end-users bear a fixed fee 
 
W
to get access from the broadband provider and content providers pay a fixed fee to 
reach end-users. Precisely, end-users pay an uniform fee i.e.   12   p pp   for network 
access and content providers can get access to the network que flat rate   
12 
 at a uni
f ff    with   12 0  ss  . That is, ISP subscriptions for end-users are fixed rate and 
es are in nt from the traffic their contents generate. 
From (alpha) and considering that end-users pay a fixed fee to get acc
CPs charg depende
ess from the ISP, 
market shares for content providers are given by: 
21 1 2 () 1











aximizing (prCP) with respect to   M i   and using (alpha), we can derive efforts both 
content providers exert to attract end-users: 










   (1.5) 
Profits derived from these efforts are then given by  
 


































11 2 22 1 8 (, ) (, ) 0

  
   
a NN NN
t   as    1    . 
cy in quality investment its net return  low
where the two constraints are needed to ensure that the market is covered and both 
Indeed, because of CP2' less efficien s are er 
than CP1  when uniform pricing applies. Using (1.1),  (1.2),  (1.3) and (1.5), the 
maximization problem for the ISP is thus given by: 
22 1 max 2 2       s.t.      ( , )      
NN
I pf pc f 1 1 , 0 and  (1 ) 0      
Np t  

























  Equilibrium market shares are: 
2
12 2
1( 1 ) 1














    a t  . 
Equilibrium profits write: 

















a   (1.6) 












  (1.7) 
Expression  (1.6) shows that the ISP profit is composed of two terms. The first 
( 2 2  
t c ) corresponds to the consumer's surplus created by the investment in access 
quality. The remaining term represents the consumer's surplus indirectly created by the 
content quality and captured by the ISP. In expressions  (1.7) we see that CP1 earns a 
positive profit alone. This profit represents the consumer's surplus it obtains directly from 
the content quality it has created. As CP2 is the least efficient firm, the ISP gets its entire 
surplus choosing an appropriate flat rate. 

































Proposition 1. When flat rates apply, it exists a level of advertising profitability (a ) such 
that ISP's incentives for investing in access quality is negative whenever advertising 
returns are sufficiently high (  aa ) and conversely. 
 
 
This Proposition states that investment incentives of the ISP in access quality depends 
on the level of the unit receipt of advertising for the CPs. One can easily see in 
expression  (1.8), that when   0  a   (i.e. advertising is free) the ISP's incentives for 
investing in access quality is unambiguously positive. On the other hand, when     takes 
very high values, this incentives are  unambiguously negative. In the appendix, we show 
that there exists a level of advertising profitability (i.e. the threshold  
a
a  ) under which the 
ISP's incentives positive for all parameter values. Therefore, when advertising is more profitable (i.e.     is above the threshold   a a ) an incremental investment turns the ISP 
profit down. In appendix, we also show that the threshold  a   is a decreasing function of  
.   
The intuition is that there is a tradeoff between advertising and access quality that may 
occur at the equilibrium. When advertising is weakly profitable (i.e. low values of   ), the 
CPs provide low quality for there contents and thus, consumers' valuations for their 
contents are low. In this case, to elicit consumers' demand for contents, the ISP has 
necessarily an incentive to increase its access quality. Hence, this investment allows the 
ISP to post a high access fee and get more surplus from consumers than without any 
additional investment. When advertising is very profitable (i.e.  a  above  
a
a  ), 
consumers have high valuations for contents, reducing therefore the ISP incentives to 
increase its access quality. This situation is more likely when the additional investment is 
realized from an existing high access quality. 
 
3. Termination fees 
 
In the previous section, we have determined equilibrium outcomes and incentives to 
invest in access quality of the ISP when content providers pay a fixed fee to reach end-
users. We now analyze how introducing termination fees could modify the surplus 
breakdown between stakeholders and enhance (or deteriorate) incentives to invest in 
access quality of the ISP. 
Hence, we consider here that end-users pay an uniform fee   p   for network access and 
content providers can get access to the network at an uniform unit price, namely a 
termination fee, i.e.   , so that   12  sss 0  i f  . We first give and analyze equilibrium 
outcomes and second we propose a comparison with the benchmark case. 
 
Equilibrium 
The main difference with the benchmark case is that with termination fee, quality 
contents and thus CP market shares depends directly on pricing conditions on the CP 
side of the platform, i.e. levels of termination fee denoted    . This creates additional 
effects on the strategic decisions of firms. 
s
Now for a given termination fee, content qualities entail: 
  









  (1.9) 
Profits derived from these quality choices are  
  
 
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Straightforwardly one can show again that  
 
2 2
11 2 22 1 2
31









  Again, because of CP   ' less efficiency in quality investment its net returns are lower 
than CP . With termination fee, the ISP profit becomes  
2
2    I p sc   and the 
maximization problem for the ISP writes: 
 22 1 1 1 , max   s.t.   ( , ) 0 and  1 0           I ps pt  






  t  , the following Lemma gives termination fee equilibrium. 
 




















p   if    tt  





p   if    tt  
 
The intuition behind this result is that both equilibrium prices are related to degree of 
substitutability between contents  1  or    , i.e. parameter    . When contents are highly 
differentiated (
2 t
 tt ), competition is relaxed between CPs so that consumers are 
sufficiently captive and the ISP has no need to provide price incentives to promote CPs 
quality investments. Therefore it can set a high termination fee ( ) which leads to a 
minimal level of content's quality (
a
0   i ). Conversely, when contents are weakly 
differentiated (  tt ), some investments in content's quality are needed to increase 
consumer's valuations and for the ISP to extract more surplus. To do that it chooses a 








t a ) which give some rents to the more efficient CP. 
From  (1.9) and Lemma 1, the equilibrium quality contents depend on the degree of 




   
T t   and   
2
2 21    
T t   if    tt   ;   12 0   
TT  otherwise. 
With termination fee, again the least efficient content provider (CP2) earns zero profit 
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As previously mentioned, we address now the issue of investment incentives of the ISP 
by investigating the ISP's marginal change in its profit with respect to the level of access 
quality parameter,   . In the line of the previous Lemma, the ISP's incentive to invest 

























of the quality access. However, when contents are strong substitutes (i.e. 
 (1.10) 
From (1.10) one can see that ISP's incentives to invest are always positive for all values 
 tt ), the ISP's incentives is greater than when contents are weak substitutes. Remark that when 
contents are strong substitutes, an increase in the access quality ( ) reduces the ISP's 
incentives to invest. 
The following Proposition sum up the above discussion 
roposition 2. Allowing a termination fee always gives positive incentives for the ISP to 
he termination fee have as main property to fully internalize the effects produced by the 
 related question that may be addressed is that does termination fees lead the ISP is to 
 
 P




unit receipt of advertising on qualities of contents. Contrarily to the benchmark case, at 
the equilibrium, the tradeoff between advertising and access quality does not occur and 
thus a marginal investment of the ISP is always profitable. 
 
A
abuse of his market power on the platform. In other words, are the ISP's profit 
maximizing termination fees may exceed the termination fees that a benevolent planner 
could choose taking into account the state of competition on the platform. To explore this 
issue, lets now consider the welfare maximization problem. Hence, mimicking the ISP 
problem, the welfare maximizing scheme ( , sp ) solves 
  1 1 1 , ) 1 0        p   22 max   s.t.   0 ;  ( , 0 and      I ps TP  t
 
From the solution of this problem (given in Appendix), one can derive the following 
roposition 3. Whenever  
Proposition. 
 
P      and    tt  , the ISP profit maximizing termination fee 
aximizing termin never exceeds the welfare m ation fee. 
 
he result shows that when competition between CPs (similarly efficient i.e.   T    lower 
than    ) is sufficiently fierce (t  low), optimal termination fees are never lower than the 
ISP termination fees. In this situation, one can consider that the ISP does not abuse of 
its market power on the content side of the platform fixing a high termination fee. This 
results from the fact, the ISP can capture rents on both sides of the platform whereas 
the benevolent (utilitarist) regulator cannot achieve this trade-off. As shown in Lemma 1, 
when contents are strong substitutes (  tt ), the ISP chooses a relatively low 
termination fee to give incentives for CPs to invest in quality in order to retrieve rents on 
the consumer's side. 
 
Flat rate vs. termination fee 
tween flat rate and termination fee regimes. In the 
rices and content qualities 
This part is devoted to comparisons be
following we then study how introducing termination fees affect all equilibrium outcomes, 
the surplus breakdown and ISP's investment incentives in access quality. 
 
PWe first compare unit fees for consumers and content qualities in both flat rate and 






 a t   and state 
the following lemma. 
 
 tt   and   () 

tt   then   () 
TN p p  Lemma 2  (i) When     and   ()   
TN
ii  
  (ii) When    tt   then    
TN p :  
T
ii p   and for   1, 2  i  
N
onsider the case (ii) where contents are weak substitutes. In this
 
C  situation, introducing 
a termination fee reduce both unit access price and content qualities compared to flat 
rates. The intuition is that, as we have already seen, offering an access to a platform, 
the ISP can capture rents on both sides. Using a termination fee instead of a flat rate 
alleviate the incentives for the ISP to post a high unit access price on consumer's side 
because he can get surplus directly from the CPs choosing a termination fee that fully 
internalizes the effect of advertising (see Lemma 1). Consequently, content qualities turn 
down. These results also happen when contents are strong substitutes (i.e.    

ttt ) 
because the termination fee is closely set to the fully internalizing level. For intermediate 
values of the degree of substitutability between contents (i.e.    

ttt ), the equilibrium 
termination fee does not fully internalize the effect of advertisin a result, the ISP 
must choose a higher unit access price than the flat rate configuration. Remark that this 
intermediate case does not appear when advertising is very profitable (a  is high)
g. As 
 and surplus in both flat rate and termination fee. Define another 
3. 
Profits and Surplus 
We now compare profits




 Assume that the degree of substitutability between contents is not too   Proposition 4.
high (  ttt ) and advertising is not so profitable ( ˆ  aa ). Compared to flat rate, 
termina e (i) increase the ISP profit ; (ii) do not decrease CPs profits; (iii) and yield 
a higher consumer surplus. 
 
tion fe
hese results show that a termination fee may be profitable both for firms (ISP and CPs)  T
and consumers. In appendix we precisely show that these results occur when contents 
are not too strong substitutes (   ttt ) and the unit receipt of advertising takes low 
values. Hence, the ISP benefits from using a termination fee instead of a flat rate (i) and 
this benefits to content providers (ii). The intuition behind this result is closely related to 
the one discussed in the previous Lemma. In Lemma 2, we show when contents are not 
too strong substitutes, the unit access price for consumers is relatively high but a 
termination fee push up the level of content qualities. Result (iii) shows that the later 
effect dominate the former and the termination fee finally increases the consumer 
                                                 
 3
Indeed   t


















Incentives to invest for the ISP 
es, namely flat rate and termination fee, on the CPs 
t in both price regimes leads to the following Proposition. 
roposition 5. Introducing the termination fee increases incentives to invest for the ISP 
Now, we study how both price regim
side of the platform affect the ISP's incentives to expand its network access quality. 
Broadband operators usually claim that content providers act as free-riders since with a 
flat rate they do not support the intensive use of network. In turn, this alleviate the ISP's 
investment incentives and finally harms end-users. We give here some explanations 
about these potential effects. 
Comparing incentives to inves
 
P
(i) if advertising is sufficiently profitable (  aa ) or (ii) if contents are weakly differentiated 
(  tt ). 
 
As can be seen from Proposition 1, the ISP has no incentive to invest in access quality 
when the unit receipt for advertising is high. On the other hand, Proposition 2 shows that 
the termination fee give always ISP incentives to invest whatever the level of the unit 
receipt for advertising. From these two results, we obtain directly (i) in Proposition. 
Furthermore, with the termination fee and when contents are strong substitutes (  tt ), 
the ISP's incentives to invest in access quality is the greater (see (1.10)). Although the 
ISP's incentives are positive with the flat rate when advertising is not so high, it does not 
exceed incentives produce by the termination fee regime. This results because the 
tradeoff between advertising and access quality, discussed following Proposition 1, does 
not occur in the termination fee regime. Hence, the effect of advertising is fully 
internalize and ISP can get entirely the return of its investment in access quality. 
 
An implication of last Propositions is the following. 
 1. Assume that the degree of substitutability between contents is not too high 
 
 Corollary
(  ttt ) and advertising is not so profitable ( ˆ  aa ). Then, the termination fee increases 
both the ISP profit and its incentives to invest, and benefit to consumers. 
 
This corollary results directly from Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. Results highlight that 
 following on two main extensions. The first extension consists to 
there are parameter values for which allowing to charge a termination fee provides 
positive incentives for the ISP to marginally increase its access quality, and this benefits 
to consumers. It is particularly the case when both contents are of an intermediary 
degree of substitutability and the unit receipt of advertising is low. The intuition derives 
directly from that developed for last propositions. 
 
5. Extensions 
We focus briefly in the
depart from the linear price for termination fees considering that the ISP can now 
engage in price discrimination. The second extension introduces the possibility for CPs 
to control traffic and we analyze in this setting how termination fees may give CPs better incentives to management traffic. 
 
Termination fee discrimination 
age in price discrimination may be welfare 
termination fees    and     to price discriminate 
Allowing a monopolist, the ISP, to eng
improving compared to linear price. In the following, we first analyze whether the ISP 
has an incentive to charge discriminating termination fees to content provider, and how it 
could affect the consumer surplus. 
We assume that the ISP can use    1 s 2 s
between content providers. We now consider that end-users pay an uniform fee   p   for 
network access and each content provider can get access to the network at a unit price  
i s   i.e.   1 s   and   2 s   can be now different, so that   0  i f  . 
om (pr P), we obtain the equilibrium content qualities:  Fr C





12      and     
22  tt
 (1.11) 
Engaging in termination fee discrimination, ISP is able to capture more of the CPs' 
me: 
surplus. However, it remains the well known trade off: a high termination fee alleviates 
ISP to charge high unit access price to consumers, and a lower termination fee induces 
high content qualities increasing the consumers' valuation and allowing ISP to charge a 
higher access unit price. Discrimination could be more efficient as it gives additional tool 
for the ISP to solve this trade off. 
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e now assume that     is fixed to a given level, denoted   1 s 1  ss W  , and we analyze how 
ling t
 Suppose that a give termination fee is set to  
the investment incentives of the ISP is maximized by control he termination fee   2 s  . 
The following Proposition shows how departing from uniform pricing (no termination fee 
discrimination) the ISP's investment incentives may move with price discrimination. 
 
s  (here   1  ss  Proposition 6.  ). Allowing 
price discrimination leads to a higher investment incentives of the ISP. When the CP 1 ' 
termination fee is set at  s , then there exists a termination fee   2
  ss   that gives the 
best incentive to invest for the ISP. 
 
When termination fee discrimination is assumed, the ISP can improve his incentives to 
invest choosing a lower termination fee for the less efficient content provider (CP2). This 
a standard rent extraction result. One can remark that discrimination is stronger (i.e.  
2
  ss   is large) when content are weak substitutes (t  large) or when efficiency gap 
een CPs is more important (i.e.   betw    is larger over    ).  1CPs incentive to manage traffic 
To investigate this issue, we need to introduce a new parameter,   [0, 1]   i , which 
represents the effort produces by CPs to control the traffic that they pass through the 
ISP's network for delivering their contents to end-users. In the following, we come back 
to the case of no price discrimination. Hence, the ISP charge a same termination fee for 
both CPs. 
The CPs profits write now: 

2 ( , ) ( 1 )           for  , 1, 2 and 
2

         
i
ii j i i i i i as f i j  i j   (1.13) 
 
Expression  (1.13) shows how the parameter that represents the effort of traffic 
management of CPs affects their profits. Hence, a high value for  i  means that CPi  
carefully manages its traffic: for each consumer, the CP    earns an unit receipt,   , 
from advertisers whereas he pays  
i a
  1   i   unit of access to the ISP, which is less than 
unity. Therefore, increasing  i  mitigates the impact of the termination fee for the CP  .  i
The question here is how terminations fee impacts on incentives of CPs to marginally 
increase  i , and in turn what could be the best regime for consumers. 
Considering a termination fee    , we deduce from  s (1.13) the equilibrium content 
qualities as: 
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Proceeding as section 4, we derive, from the maximization problem of the ISP, 
outcomes equilibrium. From the same reason than previously, as CP    is the least 
efficient firm, the ISP can get its entire surplus with the termination fees. 
2
The following Proposition states how termination fees affect the most efficient CP's 
incentives to manage traffic. 
 
 Proposition 7. Suppose that both CPs produce the same effort to manage their traffic 
( 12    ) and contents are strong substitutes ( 

tt ): (i) the most efficient CP has 
incentives to manage its traffic in a better way; (ii) this incentive increases with the 
network access quality ( ) offered by the ISP. 
 
The economics behind Proposition 7 is as follows. Consumers value more for contents that have a high quality. As content quality is an increasing function of  i , CP1 has 
then an incentive to provide a better traffic management. This, in turn, leads the ISP to 
choose a relatively high termination fee (as shown in Appendix) and this hurts the CP 1 
's profit. Thus, for CP1 it appears a tradeoff between managing traffic (increasing   1   ) to 
attract more consumers, and supporting a low termination fee (decreasing   1   ) to 
directly increase its profit. When contents are strong substitutes, the ISP chooses a low 
termination fee to induce a higher content quality from CPs. In this case, CP 1  can 
increase its effort to manage traffic without inducing a too high termination fee. Result (ii) 
shows that a better access quality gives more incentives to content providers to control 
their traffic. This highlights complementarity between access quality and traffic 
management from CPs. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Are more sophisticated pricing schemes than the so-called "net neutrality " may increase 
economic efficiency on telecommunication platforms? How these pricing scheme are 
able to enhance incentives to invest from Internet service providers? Broadband 
operators usually claim that content providers act as free-riders since with a flat rate they 
do not support the intensive use of network. In turn, this alleviate the ISP's investment 
incentives and finally harms end-users. In this paper, we aimed to tackle these questions 
analyzing the benefits and pitfalls of non-discrimination/discrimination rules for network 
access using a simple model of two-sided platform. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. First departing from the "net neutrality" 
status-quo where flat rates are used, introducing termination fees may increases 
incentives to invest for the ISP, more precisely when one-sided revenues from the 
platform for content providers (i.e. advertising) are sufficiently high or when contents are 
weakly differentiated. Moreover if the degree of substitutability between contents is not 
too high and advertising is profitable but not extremely, termination fees increase both 
the ISP profit and benefit to consumers. In some sense, our results support the idea that 
termination fees can be an appropriate instrument to regulate a too intensive use of 
network by content providers and therefore to alleviate the Internet service providers 
incentives to invest in network extension or enhancement. 
 
References 
Cheng, H. Kenneth, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay, and Hong Guo, The Debate on Net 
Neutrality: A Policy Perspective, Information Systems Research, March 2011, 22 (1). 
in press. 
Choi, Jay Pil and Byung-Cheol Kim, Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives, RAND 
Journal of Economics, in press. 
Economides, Nicholas and Joacim Tag, Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided 
Market Analysis, 2009. Working Paper, Stern School of Business, New York 
University. 
Economides, Nicolas and Benjamin Hermalin, "the Economics of Network Neutrality", 
working paper, NET Institute, december, 2010. Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Michael L. Katz, Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to 
Exchange an Electronic Message?, RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 2004, 35 
(3), 423--448. 
Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Product-Line Restrictions 
with an Application to the Network Neutrality Debate, Information Economics and 
Policy, 2007, 19, 215--248. 
Krämer, Jan and Lukas Wiewiorra, Network Neutrality and Congestion-Sensitive 
Content Providers: Implications for Service Innovation, Broadband Investment and 








(1 2 ) (1 ) 2
() 0  i f f   ()
2
   

    


I at a t
aa
t
    
 
We analyze    . 
22 (1 2 ) (1 ) 2 0         at a t
Two roots are found    

22 2 2 2 (1 ) 2 8 1 6
221 0
       





and    

22 2 2 2 (1 ) 2 8 1 6
221 0
       

    
 
t
a  . 
Remark that   0 

 
a   ;    a   if   0 







t a   if    . One can also 








at   where   1
2 2  

ta t  , such that if   

aa   then   1 
 
 
I   
for all    . However whenever   

aa   then   1 
 
 









t   such that   0 
 
 
I   , for   ˆ     . 
Lemma 1 
As     is linearly increasing in   I p  , the last constraint is necessarily binding and using it 
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. Here  TP  does not respond to   p   so the consumer's and ISP 
constraints are not necessarily binding. However, it always exist a value of     such 
that both constraints are not violated.   
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Proposition 6 
Using (prISP), (alpha) and (thetadiscrim) gives: 
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Proposition 7 
The proof is in the same line that of Lemma 1. After calculus we can show: 
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s   which is increasing w.r.t.   . 